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BOOK REVIEW
Corporate Warfare- New Style
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL. By EDWARD Ross
ARANOW AND HERBERT A. EINHORN. New York: Columbia University Press.
1973. Pp. xviii, 352. $40.00.
1. THE BACKGROUND
Corporate warfare produces few human corpses but ample economic carnage.
The traditional combat has been for markets or raw materials or financing.
Sometimes the assault is not directly for any of these, but for control of a
company which possesses them or some other desired booty.
Corporate control contests in the 1950's and early 1960's were often proxy
fights, with insurgents battling incumbents in soliciting the votes of the share-
holders. Since then the campaigns have more commonly been tender offers,
with outsiders offering to buy shares (for cash or in exchange for their own
securities), and incumbents fighting back with publicity, defensive mergers,
injunction suits, and by other means.
The training manual-and to some extent the rule book-for proxy fights
has long been ARANOW AND EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL (1st ed. 1957, 2d ed. 1968). These battle-scarred lawyers with a
scholarly bent have now provided an equally excellent volume which should
serve the same purposes for tender offer contests.
The laws of war for tender offers are more complex than those for proxy
fights. The latter include elements of state corporate and agency law, highly
detailed SEC regulation (partly substantive and partly disclosure), and anti-
fraud provisions (mostly federal). The tender offer laws have elements of
state contract law, far-reaching though relatively concise SEC regulation (partly
substantive and partly disclosure), and antifraud provisions (mostly federal).
In addition, tender offers have significant components of state blue sky and
administrative law, SEC market regulation, federal margin regulation, Invest-
ment Company Act restrictions, resale problems under the Securities Acts,
and intricate tax and accounting provisions.
2. THE BOOK
This knot of rules is the subject of the new book. Aranow and Einhorn
approach them descriptively and operationally: what the rules are and how
to fight (or function) within them. Planning by teams of experts, and develop-
ing strategies in anticipation of countermoves, are set in this context. The
technique is integrative: showing how the rules interrelate (sometimes crazily).
The emphasis is legal, but one of the important strengths of the book is its
conflation of business, financial, stock market, and public relations aspects of
tender offers. Within the legal area, the stress is on corporate and securities
subjects rather than on antitrust. The organization is logical and easy to follow.
The viewpoint is mostly that of the tender offeror (or its counsel), although
the authors shift to the target, company's side in dealing with some issues.
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The style is straightforward, except for some law review circumlocutions of
the "would appear" and "might be considered" variety.
The early chapters describe the features (mostly economic) that make a
company a likely target (chapter 1) and the preparations that go into making
a tender offer (chapter 2). These include the diverse factors in designing and
pricing the offer (pp. 29-41). Chapter 3 is a step-by-step guide to the contents
of an offer: terms, contingencies, and mechanics. Chapter 4, nearly a third of
the book, covers the federal regulation of tender offers, mostly from the 1968
Williams Act and 1970 amendments. Among the particularized analyses in
this area are the required filings and disclosures (especially the troublesome
disclosure of the offeror's plans for the target company, pp. 99-104), the
substantive requirements (withdrawal rights before seven and after sixty days,
extension of offer price increases to prior tenderors, and pro rata acceptance
of tenders in the first ten days, pp. 134-39), and restrictions on market trans-
a.ctions apart from the offer (pp. 128-34, 19-29). An interesting excursion
covers special federal regulation when the target is an air carrier, broadcaster,
utility holding company, etc. (pp. 146-52).
The remainder of the book deals mainly with other regulatory aspects:
state law, which tends to be highly obstructionist (chapter 5 ); the Investment
Company Act of 1940, which may apply disastrously to the successful offeror
(chapter 7); and problems (under the registration requirements of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and under the short swing insider trading provision of the
Exchange Act section 16(b) ) in disposing of shares acquired by an unsuccess-
ful offeror (chapter 8).
Chapter 6 illuminates the mysteries of stock market behavior during a
tender offer, principally the work of arbitrageurs. Their techniques and goals
are described (pp. 173-91) and the offeror is counselled how to procure
their valuable support (p. 191). The prohibitions on short tendering are
explained (pp. 125-28).
Defensive tactics, including contingency planning, are examined in depth
in chapter 9. A final chapter summarizes SEC and private enforcement of the
federal securities laws. There is an appendix consisting of the full text of
statutes, rules and releases, and a better than average index.
In each section, the reader will find the text of relevant statutes and rules,
references to law reviews, a rather full statement of leading cases (judicial and
administrative) with citations of the others, a probing and operationally ori-
ented discussion of the main problems, and (usually) the authors' answers,
with supporting reasons, to the questions which have not yet been answered
by judicial or administrative bodies. These include a discussion of what is a
tender offer (pp. 69-76), and when a potential "group" must file a tell-all
Form 13D with the SEC (pp. 83-93).
Various themes weave skillfully across the basic organization. Thus, the
protean federal fraud provision, Rule lOb-5, and its tender offer analogue,
Exchange Act section 14(e), are treated at various points in terms of sub-
stance (pp. 23-24, 116-25, 237-44) and remedies (pp. 277-98). The move
elusive Rule lOb-6, which prohibits buying while distributing, is traced into
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various situations, for example (1) the possibility that it prohibits an arbi-
trageur, who is also a broker-dealer, from receiving a soliciting dealer's fee
from the offeror for the shares he tenders (pp. 187-91; the authors argue
convincingly that it does not), and (2) the probability that a target company
planning a defensive merger (a "distribution") is barred from buying its own
shares in the market (pp. 240-42), or that the proposed merger partner,
if it will issue its shares in the merger, is so barred (p. 243).' The authors,
as befits proxy experts, note that the early warning provisions of the takeover
rules may have an impact on proxy contests by requiring nascent groups to
disclose their plans on 13D forms before they have begun to solicit proxies
(pp. 93-94).
While the proxy contest is by nature hostile, the tender offer is not, and it
is in fact often used for friendly takeovers. By titling and structuring their
new book to parallel the old one, the authors highlight the hostile offer. But
much of what they say is equally applicable to the negotiated tender offer
supported by target company management. Similarly, parts of the book are
germane to takeovers through open market or private purchases which do not
involve tender offers (pp. 77-105, 114-16).
3. THE CRITIQUE
The burst of tender offers by conglomerates in the late 1960's produced an
abundance of articles by lawyers, economists, and businessmen. This book is
the first to pull it all together. It is an excellent, functional, thoughtful book
and deserves a wide following among corporate lawyers and their clients and
judges.
No book reaches perfection, at least in the eyes of a reviewer. The imper-
fections I see in this book are omissions rather than commissions. They fall
into three categories: technical, practical, and policy.
Since this is a technical book, I would like to see fuller treatment of a
number of technical points, for example, when (if at all) an unsecured loan
may be used to finance a tender offer without violating the margin require-
ments." I feel the need for a better illustrated connection between the disclosure,
in the offer, of the offeror's plans for the target company and whether the
offeror becomes an Investment Company on completion of the offer.' Trouble-
' The related problem of the applicability of Rule lOb-13 (prohibiting purchases by the
offeror outside the offer) to the merger partner is explored at pp. 133-34.
'P. 42 at n.92. Part of the problem is determining whether various constraints on the
securities, short of a formal pledge, are in fact a security interest. Cf. Cooper v. Union Bank,
354 F. Supp. 669, 675, 677-80 (C.D. Cal. 1973), giving a very broad interpretation to the
Federal Reserve's definition of "indirectly secured."
'On the one hand, claims of control made to avoid investment company status, may
have to be disclosed in the offer. See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem.
Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (proxy statement for merger of company into
34% parent was misleading in failing to disclose that parent had control of company; par-
ent had represented to SEC, in seeking Investment Company Act exemption, that it held
working control of the company). On the other hand, claims of intent to obtain control-
which may support Investment Company Act exemption-will trigger the required dis-
closure of "plans" for the target company, which may easily become misleading because of
the high level of contingency of any plans in a hostile takeover. See 1 A. BROMBERG, SE-
CURITIEs LAW: FRAUD Sec. 6.3(463) (1971).
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some problems of disclosure of tax consequences deserve consideration.4 The
exemption from Securities Act registration for exchange offers approved by
certain state administratorse merits mention although it is unlikely to be very
helpful in a contested offer.'
There is a good discussion of whether target company management must
take a stand for or against an offer (pp. 219-22) and a treatment of conflict
of interest in their opposing an offer (pp. 229, 249). But there is only a
brief reference to the more pervasive problem of conflict of interest when
the same management accepts salary increases, options, and other personal
benefits to support an offer (pp. 221-22 n.10) and no discussion of the
disclosure then required. The catalogue of defensive responses to a tender offer
is comprehensive, but there are a few possibilities I didn't see covered, such as
inspiring a suit by shareholders of the offeror, or making a counteroffer for
the offeror's shares.
Since this is a highly practical volume, concerned with making and resisting
tender offers, and not just analyzing the law, I am surprised at the absence of
forms. Although there are examples of answers to particular disclosure items
in the SEC forms (e.g., p. 99 on "plans" for target companies), there is no
complete model (real or hypothetical) of a Form 13D or of a tender offer or
transmittal letter. Such models, although seldom suitable for direct copying,
would be helpful to the harried lawyer who finds himself in a tender offer.
Policy analysis is hardly obligatory in a book like this. But the authors
have made some evaluations of the controversial legislation of recent years.
They are critical of state "local interest" statutes (p. 172) and of the "free
ride" given investors who tender at one price and receive the benefit of a later
4 The courts have indicated that an offeror need not disclose that a cash offer will result
in a taxable transaction. See Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840,
843 (2d Cir. 1967), noting the wide awareness of tax consequences and availability of tax
advice. But see Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting
Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1104, 1114 (1969).
An exchange offer could be materially misleading for failure to disclose adequately that
it will be taxable (1) if it is for debentures, warrants or non-voting stock, (2) if the offeror
obtains less than 80% of the target company's shares, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §;§
368(a) (1) (B), 368(c), or (3) if other consideration, perhaps long-term employment con-
tracts to target company officer-shareholders, is considered "boot" which destroys the "solely
for voting stock" requirement of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (B). See B. BITT-
KER & J. EUSTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
14-37 (3d ed. 1971).
Then there is the fascinating question whether IT&T sufficiently divested itself of an 8%
block of Hartford Fire, previously acquired for cash, to avoid integration of the prior acquisi-
tion with the later exchange offer that would destroy the "solely for voting stock" proviso.
See Rev. Rul. 72-354, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 216 (unconditional sale to unrelated party per-
mits later "B" reorganization). For the details of the IT&T transaction, which may have been
neither unconditional nor to an unrelated person, and for the private ruling obtained from
the Internal Revenue Service, see Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1972, at 1, col. 6. For Prof. Bittker's
questioning of the ruling, and the IRS reply, see id. Nov. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 5 and Nov. 29,
1972, at 1, col. 5. The IRS later announced that it was reconsidering the ruling, id. Apr.
19, 1973, at 4, col. 3.
Nondisclosure, in the offer, of a serious tax question like this could make the offer re-
scindable by holders who accepted it, even if the IRS never challenged the transaction. A
pending shareholder suit against IT&T so alleges. Id. Oct. 12, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
5Securities Act § 3(a) (10), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (10) (1970). CAL. CORP. CODE
25142 (West Supp. 1973) provides a basis for this exemption, as do some of the insurance
company takeover statutes mentioned by the authors at pp. 169-71.
'However, the IT&T-Hartford offer, note 4 supra, was apparently made under the
3 (a) (10) exemption although contested by some parties.
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increase in the tender price (pp. 135-37). They fairly present the main argu-
ments against the current federal law of tender offers (e.g., that it protects
incumbent management more than investors, pp. 64-69), and note the effective-
ness of litigation as a defensive tactic (pp. 266-68), but conclude that the
overall impact has been salutary for investors (p. 69). This seems to me to
ignore the evolved realities that ( 1 ) it is virtually impossible to make a hostile
tender offer without at least a temporary restraining order on a claim of
securities violation,7 (2) many offers do not survive the judicial process, and
(3) many others are undoubtedly deterred by these prospects.
It would be interesting to have the authors' thoughts on whether this is the
inevitable consequence of hard fought offers (how do proxy contests compare
in this respect? ), or whether Congress has given the besieged company too
much ammunition.
Part of the difficulty, I suspect, stems from the legislative effort to assimilate
tender offers to proxy contests. Both seek to bypass management and have
the issues decided by shareholders. But there is a critical difference: the tender
offeror is buying shares, and votes that go with them; the proxy solicitor is
merely asking for votes without recompense. Correspondingly, investors get out
(sell their shares) when the offeror accepts their tenders, but stay in (continue
to be shareholders) when they give proxies. Thus, "bad" things about the of-
feror-outsider aren't very relevant to shareholders who take his cash, although
they may be relevant to holders who don't tender, whose tenders are not fully
accepted, or who receive the offeror's securities in exchange.8 I would welcome
the views of the authors, who are masters of both proxy contests and tender
offers, on this and related issues, and on the ultimate question of whether
Recently enjoined cash offers include: Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 94,088 (3d Cit. July 24, 1973); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Well-
ington Associates, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 94,041 (2d Cir. July 3, 1973), rev'g id. 5
94,007 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1973); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pac.
Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'g CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,765 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 11, 1973); Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 94,099
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1973), extended and amended offer allowed, id. 5 94,108 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 1973); General Host Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,946 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1973); Elco Corp. v. Microdot Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
5 94,157 (D. Del. Mar. 23, 1973).
See N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1972, at 47, col. 5, and at 49; Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1972, at 7.
col. 1 (Rheingold withdraws opposition to, and injunction suit against, PepsiCo. cash offer;
suit charged, among other things, nondisclosure of risk to holders of Rheingold shares not
acquired by Pepsi, which had bid for 51%; Pepsi, as part of settlement, agreed to buy all
shares tendered if it bought any).
Contra, Hanover v. Zapata Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,904 (S.D.N.Y. March
16, 1973) (preliminary injunction denied)..
See N.Y. Times, June 28, 1973, at 67, col. 3 (temporary restraining order against pro-
posed Reksten offer for Zapata not renewed).
On the other side of the battlefield, the target company and its allies are sometimes found
in violation, and enjoined. See, e.g., H. K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 5 94,083 (1st Cit. July 30, 1973), aff'g 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972);
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,816 (2d Cir.
Mar. 16, 1973).
In fairness to the authors, we should note that their manuscript was completed in August
1972 (p. vii), before this great outbreak of tender offer injunctions.
'For further development of this argument, see 1 A. BRoMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD, Secs. 6.3(220) and 6.3(832) (1971). For my views on the policies involved, see
Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 21 CAsE W.
RES. L. REV. 613 (1970).
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investors are protected by being deprived of a higher price for their shares
than would otherwise be available.
To return to the martial language with which we began, the old corporate
combats (proxy fights) were between generals, with no immediate benefits-
and only conjectural future benefits-for the troops (shareholders). The new
conflicts (tender offers), are unique in offering immediate benefits to the
troops in the form of premium prices for their shares. It begins to look as if
Congress has effectively outlawed these benefits for the troops, and has decreed
a return to the old order, where only generals benefit.
Alan R.. Bromberg*
* A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Yale University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist
University.
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